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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is gaining ground
as a pervasive presence around us by enabling miniaturized
“things” with computation and communication capabilities to col-
lect, process, analyze, and interpret information. Consequently,
trustworthy data act as fuel for applications that rely on the
data generated by these things, for critical decision-making
processes, data debugging, risk assessment, forensic analysis,
and performance tuning. Currently, secure and reliable data
communication in IoT is based on public-key cryptosystems such
as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). Nevertheless, reliance on
the security of de-facto cryptographic primitives is at risk of being
broken by the impending quantum computers. Therefore, the
transition from classical primitives to quantum-safe primitives is
indispensable to ensure the overall security of data en route. In
this paper, we investigate applications of one of the post-quantum
signatures called Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes for the
security of IoT devices in the quantum era. We give a succinct
overview of the evolution of HBS schemes with emphasis on
their construction parameters and associated strengths and weak-
nesses. Then, we outline the striking features of HBS schemes and
their significance for the IoT security in the quantum era. We
investigate the optimal selection of HBS in the IoT networks
with respect to their performance-constrained requirements,
resource-constrained nature, and design optimization objectives.
In addition to ongoing standardization efforts, we also highlight
current and future research and deployment challenges along
with possible solutions. Finally, we outline the essential measures
and recommendations that must be adopted by the IoT ecosystem
while preparing for the quantum world.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Hash-based signature, Internet of
Things, Public-key cryptography, Quantum computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE proliferation of cost-effective miniaturized deviceswith computation and communication capabilities is pro-
viding promising solutions to enhance the quality of life and
style in a plethora of ubiquitous application areas including,
but not limited to, smart cities, meteorology, health-care sys-
tems, smart grid, industrial automation, and precision agri-
culture. These devices with the afore-mentioned capabilities,
together constitute the Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. Regardless
of such comforts, the revolutionary IoT technology is vulnera-
ble to security glitches that arise due to the interconnection of
unattended and globally accessible things with the untrusted
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and unreliable Internet. Loopholes in the system infrastructure
lure adversaries to launch different attacks; for example, data
forging, Sybil attacks, false data injection, replay attacks, and
denial of participation. Such attacks will have catastrophic
consequences for the high-assurance applications that are
involved in crucial decision-making processes based on aggre-
gated sensor data (such as health-care, industrial, and financial
applications) [2], [3]. Thus, to provide data authenticity and
protection against data forgery, potential countermeasures for
IoT security are essential elements for ensuring authentic and
trustworthy data acquisition and data communication.
Security protocols usually rely on the cornerstone appli-
cations of digital signatures for authentication, integrity, and
non-repudiation. For instance, code signing of devices for
software and firmware to ensure legitimate updates or upgrades
in software suites or patches, Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT) to ensure valid cryptocurrency transactions, Vehicular
Ad hoc NETwork (VANET) to ensure trustworthy message
communication among vehicles or road-side units, and medical
implantable and wearable sensors for data integrity, use digital
signatures.
In these real-world scenarios, the most widely used crypto-
graphic schemes for digital signatures are RSA [4], Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [5], and Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [6]. Security of these classical
cryptographic primitives relies on the hardness of factoring
integers and computing discrete logarithms [7]. However, it is
expected that with the not-so-far arrival of quantum computers,
these computational problems will be susceptible to quantum
computer cryptanalysis using Shor’s quantum algorithm [8]
and variational quantum factoring [9] and therefore, can be
solved by quantum computers in polynomial time. Doubling
the key length increases the difficulty; however, this is not
enough for a sustainable edge. Furthermore, Grover’s algo-
rithm [10] can allow brute-force attacks to address the effect
of quantum computing on symmetric cryptography.
In the interim, security mechanisms of digital signatures
not only coerce the need for rigorous scrutiny to thwart
both classical and post-quantum attacks but also call for
state-of-the-art security solutions for resource-constrained and
performance-constrained IoT devices to continue utilizing the
IoT-based services in the quantum world. Therefore, the inex-
orable march of quantum hype entails dependable quantum-
safe digital signature schemes. In this regard, Hash-Based Sig-
nature (HBS) schemes [11] are promising candidates, offering
security proofs relative to plausible properties of the hash, and
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2TABLE I: Acronyms and their explanation.
Acronym Explanation Acronym Explanation
IoT Internet of Things HBS Hash-Based Signature
OTS One-time Signature WOTS Winternitz OTS
WOTSPRF WOTS (Pseudo Random Function) MTS Multi-time Signature
MSS Merkle Signature Scheme XMSS Extended MSS
HS Hierarchical Signature LMS Leighton Micali Scheme
XMSS-T XMSS with tightened security XMSSMT XMSS (Multi Tree)
FTS Few-Time Signature HORS Hash to Obtain Random Subset
PORS PRNG to Obtain Random Subset HORS-T HORS (with Tree)
DLT Distributed Ledger Technology IIoT Industrial IoT
PQC Post Quantum Cryptography PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
QRNG Quantum Random Number Generation QKD Quantum Key Distribution
the object of leading-edge standardization efforts.
A. Existing Literature
To date, not many surveys have been conducted that inves-
tigate various aspects of Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC).
To the best of our knowledge, most of the existing surveys and
articles focus on various sparse aspects of post-quantum digital
signature schemes such as providing only a panoramic view
of schemes, covering only technical details without connecting
them with any application domain, schemes (excluding HBS)
in combination with IoT, presenting HBS signatures basics
without further exploring their association to any domain,
and hence are indirectly related to the HBS-driven IoT. By
narrowing down our survey to HBS schemes featuring IoT ap-
plications and focusing on more high-level issues, we present
a holistic approach towards HBS in combination with IoT.
Starting with the most relevant paper, in [14], the authors in-
vestigate the role of HBS schemes with a focus on underlying
challenges in the IoT domain. Similarly, in [13], the authors
provide an overview of post-quantum signature schemes with
an emphasis on the basic structure of HBS schemes along
with a few example schemes from each category (i.e., stateless
and stateful), features, and standardization. [12] lays out the
obstacles to the widespread use of HBS in general. Besides,
the authors discuss the efforts needed by the cryptographic
research community to focus on the significance of stan-
dardization and integration in commonly used cryptographic
software libraries and security protocols to support the broad
adoption of HBS in the real world. On the other hand,
some works mostly cover the technical aspects (optimizing
schemes through construction parameters, mathematical anal-
ysis, and performance evaluation through implementation on
IoT platforms) of HBS schemes. These works include [11]
(discusses the problem of state management and provides
possible solutions to solve it), [15] (discusses optimization of
stateless HBS schemes), and [16], [17], [18] (implement and
evaluate proposed schemes on IoT devices), to name a few.
Lastly, the focal point of the existing articles includes other
classes of post-quantum signature schemes in the view of the
IoT domain. For example, [19] discuss the role of PQC in IoT
and associated open challenges. [7] focuses on lattice-based
and multivariate polynomial-based algorithms for constrained
devices and networks. Similarly, [20] emphasize the suitability
of lattice-based cryptography by securing the communication
between IoT and edge devices. Table II presents a summary
of these surveys and their differences with our survey.
B. Scope of This Survey
In this paper, we present a comprehensive and systematic
review of state-of-the-art technical, non-technical, and social
issues that arise due to the integration of IoT in HBS schemes.
The main contributions of our paper are summarized as
follows.
• Starting from the potential grounds for the transition
to post-quantum signature schemes, we discuss the key
questions to elaborate the reasoning behind this transi-
tion and further actions. Then, we provide a high-level
working of the family of HBS schemes categorized as
stateless, stateful, and hybrid based on key generation,
signature generation, and other construction parameters.
Along with the evolution of HBS schemes, we also
highlight the strength and weaknesses of the respective
schemes.
• We focus on the features of HBS schemes and their
significance for securing the application-dependent and
platform-dependent IoT.
• With reference to IoT-driven use-cases, we present var-
ious elemental factors that must be considered while
introducing HBS schemes in the IoT ecosystem.
• In addition to the on-going standardization efforts and
state-of-the-art industrial efforts, we provide an in-depth
review of various research challenges such as technical,
non-technical, and social challenges. We also map such
requirements from IoT perspectives, highlight the open-
ended challenges that need to be addressed by the re-
search community, and finally outline recommendations
to prepare and act strategically while moving towards the
quantum era.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Table I lists
all the acronyms used in the paper. Section II covers HBS
schemes by including a quick high-level overview of the differ-
ent types of stateful and stateless HBS schemes. The peculiar
features of HBS schemes and their significance for the IoT
domain are outlined in Section III. Considering the constraints
of IoT devices, the usage of HBS in the IoT environment is
presented in Section IV. Section V describes the technical,
non-technical, and social challenges and requirements of HBS
schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
3TABLE II: Existing surveys and articles.
Year Paper Topic(s) of the article/survey Related content in our paper Enhancements in our paper
2015 [12] Further advantages of hash-
based signatures, Obstacles to
Widespread Use, Bridging the Gap
Section V-A, Section V-B1 Coverage of technical, non-technical, and
social challenges along with possible so-
lutions to the respective problems in case
of both stateful and stateless HBS schemes
from IoT design and implementation per-
spective; Current state-of-the-art standard-
ization efforts and industrial scale imple-
mentation efforts.
2016 [11] Stateful Hash-Based Signature
Schemes One-time, State
Synchronization Security Risks,
Overhead for hash-based signatures
Section II-B, Section V-B1 Overview of stateful and stateless HBS
along with detailed taxonomy; In-depth dis-
cussion on technical and non-technical chal-
lenges particularly in the context of IoT.
2017 [13] Hash-Based Signature Basics,
Challenges and trade-offs
Section II-B, Section III, Sec-
tion V-A, Section V-B1
Overview of stateful and stateless HBS
along with detailed taxonomy; Up-to-date
standardization efforts; Coverage of HBS
features from the perspective of IoT domain.
2017 [7] Ongoing projects and develop-
ments
Section V-A Up-to-date standardization efforts including
the state-of-the-art industrial-scale efforts.
2018 [14] Hash-based signatures, Challenges Section V-A, Section V-B1 Up-to-date standardization efforts; Detailed
technical and non-technical challenges.
HBSStateless
FTS
HORS/PORS
HORS-T
SPHINCS
SPHINCS+
SPHINCS-
Simpira
SPHINCS-
Gravity
Hybrid
Stateless
Stateful
Stateful
OTS
Lamport-
Diffie
WOTS
WOTSPRF
WOTS+
MTS
MSS
XMSS
HS
XMSS-T
XMSSMT
LMS
Fig. 1: Taxonomy of hash-based signature schemes.
II. TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL DIGITAL
SIGNATURES TO HASH-BASED SIGNATURES
Starting with the limitations of traditional digital signature
schemes due to looming threats by quantum computing to
traditional cryptographic solutions, in this section, we present
the potential reasons for the transition to quantum-secure
schemes. Then, we discuss quantum-safe security solutions as
HBS schemes. We provide a quick overview of the evolution
of HBS schemes to address the problems of key generation,
signature generation, signature verification, etc.
A. Limitations of Classical Digital Signature Schemes
The end of traditional cryptosystems is marked by the Shor’s
and Grover’s algorithms. On one hand, the Shor’s algorithm
solves the underlying mathematical problems of public-key
algorithms (as mentioned in Table III) whereas, on the other
hand, Grover’s algorithm can reduce the effective security
strength of algorithms (such as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [21] and 3-DES (Triple Data Encryption
Standard) [22]) to roughly half for a given key length, thereby
rendering infrastructures secured by them vulnerable to ex-
ploitation [23].
With the proliferation of quantum computing technologies,
the epoch-making incident of the end of the currently used
classical digital signature scheme in the foreseeable future
raises the following concerning questions. The first question
is that despite conjectured security of the underlying crypto-
graphic mechanisms, why the traditional signature schemes
4TABLE III: Examples of widely deployed cryptographic systems for 128-bit pre-quantum security level.
Class Public-key Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography
Cryptographic primitives Integer factorization Discrete logarithm Elliptic curves
Cryptosystems RSA DH DSA Elgamal ECDH ECDSA AES SHA-256 (pre-image security)
Post-quantum security level
(broken by algorithm) Shor Shor Shor Shor Shor Shor Grover Grover
are unable to withstand the quantum computers? Crudely put,
the exponential speed-up brought about by quantum computer
stems from the fact that it acts as a massively parallel com-
puter which is made possible by quantum mechanics called
superposition (i.e., the ability for a quantum bit (qubit) to
be both a one and a zero at the same time). Thus, proper
implementation of superposition state in a quantum computer
can provide exponential computing power which may break
all existing schemes.
The second question is, what will happen if all the current
cryptographic security solutions suddenly become ineffective?
The failure of classical cryptosystems may have a devastating
effect on the systems and may lead to the destruction of the
security fabric that connects much of the omnipresent IoT
world today and in the near future. Thus, in addition to other
domains, the IoT applications that rely on pivotal features
of existing digital signatures, principles of data integrity,
message authentication, and non-repudiation, are going to have
profound aftermath on sensory data in terms of security and
privacy.
The third question is when such a dilemma is going to hap-
pen? According to the experts at the University of Waterloo,
there is a 1-in-7 chance of these cryptographic primitives being
affected by quantum attacks in 2026, and a 1-in-2 chance by
2031 [24].
Finally, the fourth question is, what to do now? To provide
security to IoT applications, quantum-safe schemes are ex-
plored by academia and industry. The post-quantum signature
schemes can be classified into five categories as i) Hash-based
ii) Lattice-based iii) Multivariate polynomial based iv) Code-
based, and v) Super-singular isogeny based schemes. Among
these quantum-secure signature schemes, we opted for HBS
schemes because they are well-studied schemes with minimal
security requirements, practiced, reasonably fast, yield small
size signatures, and have strong security guarantees, to name a
few. The afore-mentioned discussion calls for the transition to
quantum-secure algorithms to ensure adequate cryptographic
protections in the hyper-connected IoT world. In the following,
we dive a bit deeper into the stateless and stateful HBS
schemes.
B. HBS Schemes: From Stateful to Stateless
The design principle of HBS is to leverage an underlying
cryptographic secure hash function that exhibits any of the
security property including one-wayness, pre-image resistance,
second-preimage resistance, and collusion resistance. Based
on the implementation approach, HBS schemes can be clas-
sified as stateless and stateful schemes which can be further
categorized as One-Time Signature (OTS), Few-Time Signature
(FTS), Multi-Time Signature (MTS), and Hierarchical Signa-
ture (HS), depending on key generation, signature generation,
and other construction parameters. Fig. 1 represents the de-
tailed classification of stateful and stateless HBS schemes. In
the following, we further elaborate on these categories.
C. Stateful HBS Schemes
A stateful digital signature scheme necessitates the main-
tenance of the updated non-repeated secret key upon each
signature generation process. It is essential to keep track of
non-repeated key pairs, failing which will result in the degra-
dation of the security of the cryptographic scheme. Different
categories of stateful schemes are given as follows:
1) Stateful One-time Signature Schemes (OTS): Among the
stateful signature schemes, OTS schemes form a fundamental
building block for HBS. Common examples of seminal OTS
are Lamport-Diffie scheme [25], Winternitz scheme [26], and
its variants WOTS+ [27], WOTSPRF. To sign a message with
OTS schemes, the private key is uniformly generated at
random, whereas the public key is derived as a function of
the private key, involving the underlying hash function.
Lamport-Diffie scheme provides very strong security on
minimal assumptions; however, it has some major downsides
which prevented its wide adoption. Firstly, it is one-time, mak-
ing it in-apposite for the majority of use cases of digital signa-
tures. Secondly, the keys and the signatures are extremely large
(as shown in Table IV). The deterring issue of extremely large
key length and signature size in the Lamport-Diffie scheme is
resolved through WOTS by introducing a Winternitz parameter
that controls time/memory trade-off. Therefore, reducing the
space required for keys and signatures makes WOTS a good
choice for memory-constrained embedded devices (and hence
IoT), but at the cost of slower signing and verifying process.
Overall, OTS schemes are single-use in nature (i.e., can only
sign a pre-defined number of messages with a key pair, which
introduce a key renewal overhead) and therefore inadequate to
use in real-world applications. This is because using the same
key multiple times may enable an attacker to reveal more parts
of the private key, and hence compromise the security of the
underlying scheme.
2) Stateful Multi-time Signature Schemes (MTS): To untan-
gle the peculiarity of the one-time nature of OTS schemes,
MTS schemes are proposed to construct many-time signa-
tures by using OTS as an under-structure. In [30], Ralph
Merkle proposed Merkle Signature Scheme (MSS) to generate
multiple aggregated public and private keys by combining a
large number of OTS key pairs into a single binary hash tree
structure (as shown in Fig. 2). To authenticate the relation
of a one-time public key with the global public key (also
referred to as tree root), signatures keep on appending a
sequence of intermediate tree nodes, called authentication
paths (as shown in Fig. 2). Such paths allow the validator
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Fig. 2: Merkle Signature Scheme (MSS) using One-Time Signature (OTS):
An illustration of stateful Multi-time Signature (MS) scheme. (Figure adapted
from [28].)
to reconstruct the path from the relevant one-time public key
to the tree’s root upon signature verification. To enhance the
efficacy and practicability of MSS, the following optimization
strategies are adopted based on different flavors of Merkle tree
construction, leaves calculation, and parameter specifications.
Firstly, the global private key can be efficiently constructed
by using a cryptographically secure Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (PRNG) such that from an initial seed value (which
acts as a private key), both successive seeds and one-time
secret keys are derived. Thus, in lieu of storing all OTS
secret keys, it is sufficient to store only the seed value of
the PRNG, while generating other seed values on-the-fly. It
ultimately minimizes storage requirements. Such a strategy for
global private key construction also provides forward secrecy
and existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack [31]. Nevertheless, it necessitates precise counter
management for tracking the used keys, particularly across
multiple invocations of signing algorithm, because using any
one-time private key twice is imperative to security. Secondly,
the performance-optimized BDS algorithm [32] is used for
efficient computation of authentication path such that it caches
the authentication path from the previous signature, thus, in-
stigate time/memory trade-off. To this end, concrete examples
of M-time signature schemes are Extended Merkle Signature
Scheme (XMSS) [33], [34], and [35].
3) Stateful Hierarchical Signature Schemes (HS): Although
the use of the optimized BDS algorithm provides sufficient
performance during the signature generation of XMSS im-
plementation, it is still relatively slower in generating a new
key pair due to the requirement of constructing the entire hash
tree [31]. Hence, to further improve performance, HS schemes
are proposed. In essence, HS schemes are MTS schemes that
use other hash-based signatures in its construction. The idea of
HS is based on the formation of a hyper-tree that involves tree
chaining by using multiple layers of MSS tree. In this form of
Merkle tree construction, the upper layers are used to sign the
roots of the layers below while only the lowest layer is used
to sign messages. Notable examples of HS are XMSS-Multi
Tree (XMSSMT) [36], XMSS with tightened security (XMSS-
T) [37], and Leighton Micali Scheme (LMS) [34]. XMSSMT
is particularly ideal for applications that require virtually a
large number of messages to be signed. Note that, XMSSMT
should be used in conjunction with other optimization strate-
gies, including the BDS algorithm, PRNG, and caching of
the authentication paths, otherwise the required storage and
the long time for random number generation outweigh the
performance gain of XMSSMT. Additionally, the LMS has two
variants, i.e., Leighton Micali one-time signature (LM-OTS)
and the many-time signature scheme LMS [38].
D. Stateless HBS Schemes
Keeping track of the last used OTS key pair is considered to
be one of the major downsides of stateful schemes. To address
this intriguing problem, stateless schemes are introduced. A
stateless digital signature scheme eliminates the need for
maintaining the updated non-repeated secret key upon each
signature generation process. Because unlike OTS schemes
(WOTS or its variants), stateless HBS schemes use few-
time signature schemes, for instance, Hash to Obtain Random
Subset/PRNG to Obtain Random Subset (HORS/PORS) [39]
and HORS with Tree (HORS-T) [40].
1) Stateless Hierarchical Signature Schemes (HS):
Some of the examples of the stateless HS scheme are
SPHINCS [40] and its variants SPHINCS-Simpira [41],
Gravity-SPHINCS [15], and SPHINCS+ [42]. Similar to
XMSSMT, SPHINCS uses a hypertree such that the upper
layers use XMSS with WOTS+ to sign roots of their ancestors,
while the lowest layer uses a Merkle tree construction with
HORS-T for signing messages(as shown in Fig. 3). Since the
stateless schemes do not keep a record of used key pairs, hence
to ensure the correct few-time usage of key pairs, SPHINCS
deploys multiple HORS-T key pairs and selects a random
one for each signature generation. As a result, no path-state
tracking is required.
Generating all HORS-T and WOTS+ private keys with a
PRNG for key generation and computing one tree in each layer
for signature generation results in the feasible computation for
SPHINCS. Nevertheless, stateless schemes pose the following
performance issues. Firstly, the signature generation is more
expensive because the key pairs are used in random order
rather than successive order; hence, the optimization algorithm
BDS is no longer suitable. Secondly, in contrast to WOTS+,
HORS-T signatures are relatively much larger. We summarize
the stateless and stateful class of HBS schemes along with
their signature size, key length, and other relevant details in
Table IV and Table V.
III. FEATURES OF HBS SCHEMES AND THEIR
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE IOT ENVIRONMENT
Several arguments underpinning the use of HBS schemes
in the IoT ecosystem include quantum-resistance, minimal
security assumptions, function agnostic, forward-secure con-
struction, and extensive tunable parameters. In this section, we
elaborate on the features of HBS schemes by associating their
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Fig. 3: Hypertree structure used in SPHINCS: An illustration of stateless Hierarchical Signature (HS) scheme. (Figure adapted from [29]).
TABLE IV: OTS/FTS schemes for 384-bit message length and 128-bit (approximately) post-quantum security level.
Scheme Type Signature size (KB) Key size (KB)
Lamport-Diffie OTS 18.4 36.9
WOTS OTS 4.8 4.8
WOTSPRF OTS 3.2 3.2
WOTS+ OTS 3.2 3.7
HORS/PORS FTS 1.2 3.1 MB
HORS-T FTS 17.3 0.05
TABLE V: Stateful and Stateless hash-based signature schemes:a comparative summary
Scheme Instantiation Message
length
Type Base scheme Key-reuse
capacity
Signature
size (KB)
Key size (KB)
MSS SHA-384 384-bit Stateful WOTS 260 7.7 0.05
XMSS SHA-256 256-bit Stateful WOTSPRF 260 4.7 0.03
XMSSMT AES-128 256-bit Stateful WOTSPRF 280 10.5 private key = 26.1,
public key = 1.8
SHPINCS SHA-256 512-bit Stateless HORS-T; WOTS+ Unlimited 41.0 1.0
G-SPHINCS Haraka 512-bit Stateless PORS; WOTS Unlimited 30.0 private key = 0.06,
public key = 0.03
SPHINCS-S Simpira 512-bit Stateless HORS-T; WOTS+ Unlimited 41.0 1.0
felicitous illustrations for the IoT environment. The striking
features of HBS schemes are summarized in Fig. 4.
Traditional signature schemes generally require considera-
tion of number-theoretic hardness assumptions (such as com-
posite integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem) in
addition to the security of hash functions. On the contrary,
HBS schemes solely rely on the underlying secure crypto-
graphic hash function, thereby pruning the attack surface and
reducing the opportunities for cryptanalysis. For instance, a
secure implementation of XMSS exclusively depends on a
secure cryptographic hash function that is either second preim-
age resistant or pseudorandom to be secure. Thus, the idea of
minimal security assumption in HBS effectively reduces the
complexity of implementation by eliminating the reliance on
multiple security components. Hence, it streamlines the de-
ployment among diverse implementations (such as massively
heterogeneous applications seem good candidates) and devices
(such as resource-constrained IoT devices) [33].
HBS schemes are function-agnostic, i.e., they can be built on
top of any hash function that satisfies the security requirements
of cryptographic hash functions. Such inherent flexibility of
HBS allows the selection of different underlying hash func-
tions to meet the desired performance requirements depending
on the application-specific environment. The function-agnostic
and quantum-resistant nature of HBS schemes make them
future-proof such that the underlying hash functions can be
simply substituted (in terms of implementation) in case of
vulnerabilities with any of the specific hash function over time.
For instance, to handle a multi-target attack, the researchers
shift to collision-resilient signature schemes as collision resis-
tance is subject to birthday attacks in comparison to preimage
and second-preimage resistance [43].
The feature of future-proofness manifests long-term security
of lifetime devices. One aspect of such scenarios is the
hardware protection of multitude field-deployed devices in
massive IoT. For example, the deployment of new sensor
motes in industrial automation, agriculture precision, envi-
ronment monitoring, and other mission-critical applications
are deleterious, costly, and time-consuming task; therefore,
the hardware longevity must be considered to address future
threats. Another aspect is high assurances of digitally-signed
firmware to prevent adversaries from stealing the signing
credentials of long-running devices. Another example includes
mission-critical devices that require data trustworthiness, espe-
7cially for applications that perceive the value of sensor data for
decision-making processes, risk assessment, and performance
evaluation [44]. Under both aspects, long-term security offered
by the PQC in the form of hash-based signatures must be
adopted to ensure trustworthy and healthy data in the quantum
IoT.
In order to enforce security in constrained environments, the
HBS allows an adaptable selection of parameters to enable
trade-offs between signing speed and key size rather than
using dedicated schemes. For instance, the key configuration
involving underlying lightweight hash function and design
optimization are suggested in [18] for resource-constrained
IoT.
Through PRNG, HBS supports forward-secure construction
which implies that an attacker cannot subsume any information
about previously used signature keys upon getting hold of the
current private key. Forward-secrecy plays a consequential role
in situations where devices can be tampered, compromised,
or even stolen such as remote areas or outdoor device set-
tings [14].
Features
Quantum-
resistant
nature
Future-
proofness
Minimal
security
assumption
Forward-
secure
con-
struction
Function-
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Parameter-
ization
Fig. 4: Striking features of hash-based signature schemes.
IV. INTRODUCING HASH-BASED SIGNATURES IN THE IOT
ECOSYSTEM
Improving data integrity of IoT devices against large-scale
quantum computers stems from multiple factors, for instance,
careful selection of HBS grounds for the underlying applica-
tion requirements, device constraints, and design optimization
criterion. In this section, we highlight why quantum technolo-
gies matter in critical infrastructure and IoT. Furthermore, we
discuss various factors while choosing the apt HBS from the
get-go to avoid the digital transformation pitfalls of cutting-
edge technologies.
A. Stateless or Stateful?: Adoption of Apropos HBS Schemes
The first factor is the adoption of apropos HBS for IoT
devices. Before going into further details, the crux of stateless
or stateful HBS is as under. The concept of statefulness arises
from the use of one-time signature key pairs. As the robustness
and security of HBS schemes depend completely on the use
of non-repeated one-time key pairs; tracking the utilization of
one-time key pairs is of paramount importance. To do so, one-
time signing keys are used by following a sequential order such
that an index or counter is stored in the global secret key to
infer which one-time key pairs can still be utilized for signing
purposes. In addition to the index, HBS schemes also include
an authentication path that denotes a sequence of intermediate
nodes required to reconstruct the path to the root node to
validate a one-time public key against the global public key.
In particular, different approaches consider different elements,
for example, nodes for the next authentication path or pre-
computed nodes as part of storing state data. For storing the
state information, the size requirement depends on the tree
structure, for instance, a 4-byte and 8-byte value is sufficient
for XMSS and XMSSMT, respectively. Thus, maintaining state
information including the authentication path and the key
index along with each signature equalizes the signing time.
Nevertheless, it requires to store updated state information
depending on the used parameters and implementation choices.
On the other hand, stateless HBS schemes do not require
to maintain the use of non-repeated key pairs; however, their
signature sizes are significantly higher (as shown in Table V)
making them impractical in some scenarios. Thus, the optimal
selection of a stateful or stateless scheme for embedded
systems primarily depends on the time-memory trade-off. For
instance, stateful schemes exploit memory to store state infor-
mation and have better run-time, hence, are well-tailored for
performance-oriented systems while stateless schemes exploit
processing power and have better memory utilization, hence,
are well-suited for memory-constrained systems. It can be
concluded that the stateful versions of HBS schemes offer
better performance than the stateless versions, but require
careful implementation to thwart an attacker to exploit the
vulnerabilities related to state management. Summarized com-
parison of the pros and cons of both schemes is presented in
Table VI.
For a given IoT system, the optimal selection of a state-
less or stateful HBS scheme must be carefully weighted
based on the fact that whether the system is performance-
constrained (processing time, computational complexity) or
resource-constrained (energy usage, memory consumption).
For instance, consider a nuclear reactor (as shown in Fig. 5
(right-most)) where sensors (for instance, temperature, flow,
pressure or level) are deployed in order to monitor (heating
system, water pressure, or water level). The sensors’ readings
are notified to a control room that is accountable for making
critical decisions (to turn on/off any valve or to adjust any val-
ues) based on the sensors readings. Under such a performance-
constrained environment, the integrity and authenticity of
data must be verified efficiently because operations such as
parameter tuning, data debugging, and aging management rely
on data-driven decisions. Similarly, Fig. 5 (middle) illustrates
an example of Industry 4.0 that exhibits a synergy between
industry and IoT. The example shows a smart factory where
fog-enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) can be used to
gather the tasks from the sensor, compute the tasks, and deliver
the processed results to the control unit. Under the resource-
constrained Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), the tasks are
offloaded to UAVs to conserve sensor energy. Following a
8TABLE VI: Pros and Cons: Stateless vs. Stateful hash-based signature schemes.
Type Pros Cons Use case
Stateful
• Shorter signature size
• Faster signature generation time
• State synchronization problem
(synchronization failure)
• Face cloning problem (volatile
and non-volatile)
Performance-constrained environment
Stateless
• No state synchronization problem
• No cloning problem
• Longer signature size
• Slower signature generation time
Resource-constrained environment
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Fig. 6: Combining a stateless signature scheme (such as HORS-T) at the root
level and a stateful scheme (such as LMS or XMSS) at the lower levels: A
hybrid approach. (Figure source: [13]).
better approach, stateful schemes are suitable candidates for
the former case while stateless schemes are apt for the latter
case.
A setting under which both resource-constrained and
performance-critical IoT systems are desirable, a reasonable
compromise between stateful and stateless schemes is the
hybrid approach. For instance, in [11], the authors proposed a
hybrid method by combining the stateless signature scheme
such as HORS-T and the stateful signature schemes (e.g.,
XMSS and LMS) at the root level and the lower levels,
respectively (as shown in Fig. 6). Such strategy overcomes
downsides while merging the benefits of both stateful and
stateless HBS schemes.
B. Implications of Quantum Computing on DLT
The second factor covers the imminent prodigious threats to
the applications of DLT by quantum computers. DLT despite
being a quintessence solution of the Internet of Everything
(IoE), one of the main challenges is the reliability of the
data generated by things. DLT can ensure the immutability
of data in the ledger, nevertheless when the data generated
by IoT devices is dubious or malicious due to the physical
environment, participants, vandalism, and the failure of the
devices, then its further propagation through the ledger stays
corrupted. Furthermore, the analysis and interpretation based
on such abnormal data produce catastrophic results, especially
for applications relying on data for critical decision-making
processes, risk assessment, and performance evaluation [45].
The corrupted devices either face physical damage or limit the
firmware updates to refrain them from actuating over possible
bugs or security breaches. One such solution to ensure the
trustworthiness of data by the device in question is to keep
track of data lineage through data provenance [45].
In the IoT ecosystem, blockchain is another ahead of the
curve DLT solution that has powered resource-consuming
devices to participate in Machine-to-Machine (M2M) or
Machine-to-Human (M2H) economy autonomously, for in-
stance, to support and accelerate the distributed energy in a
microgrid or electric vehicle charging (as shown in (Fig. 5
(left-most)). Currently, most of the blockchain-based solu-
tions heavily rely on conventional cryptographic standards to
support the immutability and transparency of data. However,
ledgers that are not quantum-resistant could pose long-tail
data risk. High-powered quantum computers can jeopardize
M2M or M2H world by potentially enabling attackers with
quantum computers to monopolize the network by sabotaging
transactions and preventing their own transactions from being
recorded or double-spend [46]. To prepare for the quantum
9apocalypse, blockchain-enabled schemes that already sup-
port post-quantum techniques are Quantum Resistant Ledger
(QRL) [47] (using XMSS), IOTA [48] (using WOTS), and
Corda (using BPQS: a single-chain variant of XMSS).
C. Optimal Design Objectives
The third factor is the optimized design objectives for IoT
devices. In particular, function independence characteristic
of HBS schemes make them a suitable candidate for ultra-
constrained IoT settings, for instance, the latency-area opti-
mized design approach proposed in [18]. Similarly, other de-
sign trade-offs for IoT devices include a lightweight hash func-
tion for energy-efficient computation of signature/verification
operations. For instance, in [18], the authors implement and
perform explicit area and latency analysis of four hash candi-
dates including SHAKE-256, SHA-256, S-quark, and Keccak-
400. Considering energy budget constraints, Keccak-400 is
selected.
To meet the design objectives of resource-constrained IoT
nodes, in addition to smaller parameters and light-weight
hash function, appropriate algorithms based on the design
specification of motes are needed. Such co-design principles
based on hardware and software provide a trade-off between
area overhead and hardware penalizing. For example, [18]
proposed a scheme in which WOTS+ operations are defined
at the hardware level due to a significant amount of repetitive
hash computations and to yield smaller footprints while XMSS
operations and WOTS+ parametrization control are defined at
the software level to preserve latency gains.
Another design aspect essential to all HBS is the generation
of either hardware-based or software-based random numbers.
Keeping in view that the sources of external entropy are
limited for critical IoT deployments in the isolated envi-
ronment, hardware-based random numbers are preferred (for
instance, Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG) [49]
chip). QRNG is a physically and provably secure source of
randomness in contrast to PRNG that requires monitoring
to maintain sufficient randomness for business protection as
adversaries commit additional resources to find patterns in
PRNG implementations.
D. Potential Attacks on HBS
The fourth factor is handling of the attack surface even
in the presence of quantum-resilient signature schemes, for
example, evaluating the HBS in the presence of physical (or
implementation) attacks, i.e., side-channel attacks and fault
attacks. In a differential side-channel attack, the attacker gains
extra information by eavesdropping on a side channel, for in-
stance, power-monitoring, electromagnetic leaks, or processing
timing during the computation of the signature. Whereas in a
fault attack, a fault, which can be either natural or malicious,
is misbehavior of a device that causes the computation to
deviate from its specification. The goal of the attacker is to
exploit such information to gain access to the secret. HBS
schemes are vulnerable to hardware fault attacks both in the
presence of natural and malicious faults. To address fault-
attack resistance, in [50], the authors present an implementa-
tion approach to make stateless hash-based constructions more
reliable against natural faults and malicious faults. Similarly, in
[31], the authors discuss implementation recommendations for
XMSS to resist implementation attacks (for example, selection
of side-channel resistant PRNG, computation of optimized
authentication path, and strategy for caching of signatures).
In addition, the proposed scheme can be tailored based on the
reliability objectives and available resources [7].
E. Benchmark: Software and Hardware
The fifth factor is the benchmark for evaluating the perfor-
mance of HBS. From the software benchmark perspective, the
run-time of key generation, signing, and verification processes
whereas from the hardware perspective, CPU cycles, key
size, signature size, and energy consumption are among the
targeted evaluation metrics. In general, the parameter sets
are highly dependent on the underlying construction of a
particular scheme. For software benchmarking, frameworks
such as System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related
to Cryptographic Operations and Primitives (SUPERCOP) and
ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems (EBACS)
are commonly used for the evaluation of the software per-
formance. For hardware benchmarking, Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC), Field-Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGA), or other micro-architectures can be configured and
programmed accordingly. Also, architecture-specific optimiza-
tions such as Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
(AESNI) or Advanced Vector Extensions 2 (AVX2) instruc-
tions are used to make it implementable on the available micro-
architecture [42].
F. Trust Chain: Combining HBS and Provenance
The sixth factor involves the combination of HBS schemes
and data provenance that epitomizes the importance of trust-
worthy data. On one hand, HBS ensures the accuracy, fidelity,
availability, and confidence of data, whereas on the other hand
data provenance identifies the sources behind stale, latent,
and tardy data. Therefore, such combination can solve the
problems related to erroneous or faulty data thereby enhancing
the quality of data. Another instructive use case of such
a scenario is the supply chain where data integrity and
provenance supplement each other to solve the traceability
problems, counterfeit concerns, and data accessibility issues
in the supply chain space [44].
G. Establishing End-to-End Security
The seventh factor is to establish horizontal end-to-end
security. A reliable infrastructure is a must to boost the end-to-
end ecosystem’s security especially in the presence of a diverse
range of cybersecurity threats (such as data breaches, (D)DoS
attacks, and so on) and continuously increasing demands of
efficient communication requirements (such as ultra-reliability,
low-latency). Though 5G promises to solve most of the com-
munication requirements for many versatile applications, for
example, tactile Internet, massive IoT, autonomous vehicles,
and many more. However, the inherent security flaws still
need more attention, for instance, location tracking, activity
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profiling, etc. Similarly, some other quantum-linked features
such as quantum-safe communication, quantum Internet, and
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) also require a due attention
to deftly integrating quantum computing in the fabric of 5G
and beyond.
Hence, application-specific and platform-dependent trade-
offs must be considered with regards to signing speed, signa-
ture size, a desired number of signatures, memory constraints,
processing limits, light-weight underlying hash functions, and
hardware support for particular hash functions.
H. Current Industry-scale Implementation Efforts
Albeit with a restricted number of qubits, quantum com-
puters already exist though luckily for today’s security cannot
run Shor’s algorithm. For example, a Canadian company, D-
Wave Systems was the earliest to market and has already
launched its 2000Q System quantum computer [51]. IBM Q
Quantum Computation Center is an industry-first initiative
to build commercial universal quantum systems for business
and science applications [52]. Furthermore, Google claimed
to have achieved the quantum supremacy by introducing a
superconducting quantum processor called Sycamore [53].
According to their benchmark task, Sycamore outperforms
(took 200 seconds) state-of-the-art supercomputers that would
require approximately 10,000 years to perform a random
sampling task. To continue the benchmark progress, IBM
upends Google’s claim and experimentally proved that the
same task can be performed on a classical system in 2.5 days
by incorporating other conventional optimization techniques
to improve performance [54]. In addition to these, other
companies participating in the race of developing quantum
computers include Intel, Microsoft, IonQ, to name a few. Such
back-to-back research efforts by tech-giants herald a degree of
technical maturity towards a quantum leap which ultimately
opens new frontiers for quantum computing in the IoT world.
V. STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
CHALLENGES OF HBS SCHEMES IN THE IOT
In this section, we highlight the standardization efforts
carried out for HBS schemes and future research challenges.
A. Standardization Efforts
The efforts to solicit and evaluate quantum-resistant public-
key cryptographic algorithms for an inevitable transition to
post-quantum cryptography are underway by many standard-
ization organizations. For instance, the National Security
Agency (NSA) plans to shift from the Suite B set of crypto-
graphic algorithms towards post-quantum cryptography [55].
Furthermore, workshops and calls for proposals are initiated
by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [56] in the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardiza-
tion project (evaluation of Round 2 candidate algorithms in
the process [57]) and European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI) [58] in Quantum-Safe Cryptography
(QSC) [59] project to indicate the increasing necessity of
switching to post-quantum cryptography. Regarding the spec-
ification of HBS, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
is targeting both XMSS and LMS for standardization [60],
[61]. Other ongoing projects and developments to promote
research on post-quantum cryptosystems by European Com-
mission include PQCRYPTO [62] (conducting research on
post-quantum cryptography for small devices, the Internet,
and the cloud), SAFEcrypto [63] (focuses on secure post-
quantum cryptographic solutions to preserve the privacy of
government data, and protection of data in communication
systems) [7]. Similarly, the CryptoMathCREST [64] research
project is supported by the Japan Science and Technology
Agency to study the mathematical problems underlying the
security of PQC.
B. Future Research Challenges
In the quest to secure IoT in the quantum era, follow-
ing technical, non-technical, and social challenges of HBS
schemes call for further investigation. We also outline the key
recommendations necessary to act and prepare for the quantum
era. Fig. 7 presents the detailed taxonomy of the current and
future research and deployment challenges for HBS-driven
IoT and we summarize the challenges along with causes and
possible solutions in Table VII.
1) Technical Challenges: Here we discuss technical chal-
lenges related to IoT devices with reference to quantum
computing.
a) State Management: In the stateful signing algorithms
schemes, state management is one of the challenging snags
to the widespread use of HBS schemes. In this problem, the
version of the private key in non-volatile memory (disk) must
be continuously synchronized with that in volatile memory
(RAM) to avoid key synchronization failure. Crash of an ap-
plication or an operating system, corruption of the nonvolatile
state, power outage, or a software bug could be among the
potential causes of synchronization failure [11]. The delay
caused by the synchronization of the private key between the
storage unit and execution unit results in additional latency
for the signature generation time, thus highly deteriorating the
overall performance of the system.
b) Cloning: Another problem in the stateful signature
scheme is cloning. Such type of risk occurs when a private key
is copied and then used without coordination with execution
units (known as non-volatile cloning) or without coordination
with storage units (known as volatile cloning). Live Virtual
Machine (VM) cloning or restoration of a key file to a previous
state from a backup system could potentially cause volatile
or non-volatile cloning. The cloning problem results in the
generation of multiple signatures from the same system state,
thus crucially undermining security. For instance, in case of
live VM cloning, values that may only be used once, are at
risk, including initialization vectors, pseudorandom numbers,
counters for encryption, one-time passwords, and seeds for
digital signatures [65]. Similarly, initial sequence numbers
could be reused for hijacking in the case of the S/Key (a
one-time password system) and the TCP protocol [11]. Issues
with such primitives can be problematic even for classical
digital signature schemes. To summarize, nonvolatile cloning
may not cause any issue to a system devoted only to the
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Fig. 7: Current and future challenges for HBS schemes in the IoT domain.
signature generation; however, it can cause significant risk
to the general-purpose software system. On the other hand,
volatile cloning leads to catastrophic results particularly due
to the vulnerabilities pertaining to caching of random numbers.
Therefore, tailored to specific use-cases, the state management
strategies must be gauged in a nuanced way. For instance,
resource-constrained sensor nodes piggyback on UAVs for
computation and processing of tasks (as shown in Fig. 5 (mid-
dle)). In this scenario, the issues of state management (either
key synchronization or cloning risk), may cause problems
including (i) performance issues at delivering results to control
unit, (ii) energy issues at UAVs, and (iii) data integrity risks
at the control unit.
Though stateless signing algorithms solve the state and
key synchronization concerns; however, signature size is still
a problem. To resolve the issues of stateless and stateful
schemes, a hybrid approach discerns the essential worth
with smaller signatures and faster signing deserves further
exploration. Other possible solutions suggested in [11] include
state reservation strategy and hierarchical signature schemes.
Simply put, in a state reservation approach, the private key
that is ahead of the current signature among the available
N signatures is written back into storage, thereby avoiding
the need to write the updated private key into nonvolatile
storage. In the case of a hierarchical signature scheme, a
volatile bottom level enforces the reservation property such
that the private key of the volatile level is not synchronized
in nonvolatile storage. Such combined volatile/nonvolatile
hierarchical signature scheme property avoids synchronization
problems and is considered a reasonable model for problems
related to writing operation scenarios such as power outage or
crash of an application. However, both of these solutions do
not address the nonvolatile cloning problem.
c) Specification of Parameters: Another issue is that the
universal specification of a parameter set highly depending
on the intended use-cases. Since constraints on performance
aspects such as signing speed and key size are highly depen-
dent on underlying use-cases, therefore, it is hard to define
one universal parameter set for every scenario. For example,
software update authentication does not entail high-frequency
signing, however, the converse is true for Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP) over Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Another example is the individual user’s email signing that
does not require frequent signing though, however, keeping in
view the usability considerations, the priority is given to the
signature size to limit message expansion [13].
HBS schemes need to offer concrete parameter choices
to provide user guidance while considering constraints on
performance aspects such as signing speed and key size. For
concrete instantiations, proper guidance (rules and regulations
with concrete steps) should be included in standards. In this
regard, [66], [60] suggest concrete parameter sets and discuss
the crucial element of security levels for the proposed param-
eter sets, however, unable to address their adequacy tailored
to specific applications. Thus, the use of underlying hash
function, state management strategies and other construction
parameters must be evaluated in a nuanced way depending on
the intended use-case as also discussed in subsection IV-A
and IV-C. Though the recommended parameters should be
provided by the cryptographic community; however, customiz-
ing signing speed, key size, and other construction parameters
depending on the application scenario is a crucial asset.
d) Trade-off Between Excessive Data and Performance:
Depending on the application and underlying infrastructure, a
network of things may have a dynamic and rapidly changing
dataflow and workflow where data inputs are provided from
a variety of sources such as sensors, external databases or
clouds, and other external subsystems. As the generation of
vast amounts of data over time renders IoT systems as potential
big data generators, in this regard, how can we ensure the
speed and performance of underlying HBS schemes? One
potential solution is to adopt hybrid HBS schemes to enable
a trade-off between performance-constrained and resource-
constrained environment. Besides, more efficient algorithms
may open the way to application in the diverse and constrained
reality of the vast majority of IoT devices.
2) Non-Technical Challenges: Bringing quantum comput-
ing could enable advances in many futuristic technologies;
however, it requires consideration of many significant factors.
Here, we discuss non-technical challenges related to IoT
devices with reference to quantum computing.
a) Business and Economic Setbacks: As the age of quantum
computing is gradually dawning, it seems that new hardware
systems are among constantly increasing requirements. There-
fore, the question, how IoT devices can adapt to quantum com-
puting with their current embedded hardware (such as crypto-
processors) that is generally optimized to carry out certain
cryptographic operations?, must be answered. However, the
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implications of such demands are likely to face huge business
and economic setbacks in terms of expenditures on new or
upgraded IoT infrastructures to handle the increased workload.
Thus, bringing in new hardware may be too expensive for cost-
sensitive large-scale applications that are usually looking for-
ward to cost-effective solutions by drastically reducing capital
expenditure (CapEX) and operational expenditure (OpEX).
b) Entanglement in Legacy Systems, Existing Applications,
Standards, and Protocols: In addition to the aforementioned
demand for new hardware systems, one of the substantial
concern is how to retrofit legacy systems with advanced se-
curity solutions? Because shifting to novel quantum-based in-
frastructure for IoT demands fragile engineering environment,
for example, temperature constraints for operating quantum
infrastructure, the limited range for terrestrial quantum com-
munication networks, the staggering cost of various hardware
for carrying out QKD, budget funding, and other obstacles
that may limit the usability of quantum-based systems at the
moment.
Similarly, another question is how existing applications and
protocols can adapt to quantum computing with their current
standards? One solution is to modify the existing protocols
to handle larger signature or key size by segmenting the data
into multiple massages for bandwidth-constrained applications
(e.g., self-driving cars). However, the status quo will change
as new applications and protocols must set their standards
keeping in mind the demands of quantum schemes. Existing
protocols might need to be modified to handle larger signatures
or key size, for example, through the segmentation of mes-
sages. Also, protocol designers should be aware that changes
in the underlying cryptography may certainly be necessary
for the future, either due to quantum computing or other
unforeseen advances in cryptanalysis. For new applications,
implementations must keep the demands of PQC in mind and
allow the new schemes to adapt to them as PQC requirements
might shape future application standards.
c) Heterogeneity in Terms of Application and System: An-
other unique characteristic of IoT devices is heterogeneity.
On one hand, heterogeneity may appear in terms of divergent
application requirements, for instance, resource constraints in
sensor networks, security constraints for medical implantable
devices, performance constraints for IIoT, etc. On the other
hand, it may appear in terms of diversified architecture require-
ments, for instance, interoperability across diverse platforms
from different vendors, integration of disparate sub-systems,
and the existence of compatibility among sub-systems to work
in conjunction without conflict. Possible solutions to handle
heterogeneity is to consider interoperability and integration of
systems or subsystems and to promote flexibility and include
abstractions to facilitate integration among existing applica-
tions and libraries. The systems that have prescriptive re-
quirements such as military-critical and safety-critical systems
must consider all of these aspects while enforcing appropriate
quantum-resistant algorithms upon careful identification of the
system requirements (such as performance contracting).
d) Bridging The Gap: Integrating HBS with Well-known and
Tested Cryptographic Libraries: Integrating HBS with well-
known and tested cryptographic libraries plays an ergonomic
role to ensure the wide availability of HBS in security in-
frastructures and serves the goal of absolute security shared
by all stakeholders. Though in the case of HBS, proof-of-
concept implementations exist such as [33], [67] which mark
a necessary step towards their widespread usage. On a related
note, such stand-alone implementations are unable to facilitate
both technical interfacing and strategic decisions such as
parameter selection. In [12], the authors suggested avoiding
case-by-case implementation of cryptographic primitives as it
is inopportune for organizations to develop their own spe-
cific ad hoc implementations and recommended the usage
of commonly used software cryptographic libraries (such as
Open SSL) particularly because of their ability to include
abstractions to facilitate system integration and combination.
3) Social Challenges: In the following, we discuss the
social challenges faced by HBS in IoT networks.
a) Ethical and Moral Consequences: The access to large-
scale quantum computers by the government institutions and
other research funding organizations can be analyzed from eth-
ical perspectives. For example, if access to quantum computers
is limited to a few government agencies, they may dominate
or dictate other nations (also referred to as the Big Brother
Problem). Also, considering the risk that only a few big
companies or corporate laboratories are able to afford quantum
computers due to massive investment, the entrenched giant
companies may use the efficiency gains to out-compete their
competitors and thus lead to monopolies or oligopolies [68].
Even worse, the enterprises may use it with criminal intent
such as industrial espionage for competitive advantage, mass-
surveillance, and other undesirables. Furthermore, evildoers
can harvest high-value data (such as medical data or sensitive
government data) now and break it later by using quantum
computers. The best way to make the impact of quantum
computers positive is to enable their wide accessibility to
people to run programs on them through the cloud. A toy
version of such an idea with a 5-qubit computer through
the cloud is provided by IBM’s Quantum Experience [69].
Similarly, to access quantum computing ecosystem platforms
should be provided to enable academic researchers who are
focused on theoretical work and tech-industry experts who
are familiar with real-world performance needs and security
demands to collaborate and share their experiences.
b) Skepticism in Quantum Computing: On one hand, there is
an on-going race to build universal quantum computers along
with a huge amount of scholarly literature and awareness about
the potential societal impact on the breaking down of current-
grade cryptography. On the other hand, the physical realization
of quantum computers has been a hard slog that eventually
raises serious doubts by quantum skeptics. The skeptics argued
the possibility to build a scalable quantum computer due to
various factors (such as noise, constraints on state preparation,
unreliability, virtuous cycle, manufacturing errors, etc.) though
they do agree that theoretically quantum computation does
offer an exponential advantage of classical computation [70].
Gil Kalai, one of the most prominent quantum skeptics also
argue against quantum computers due to several underlying
facts related to noise in physical systems and quantum error
correction [71].
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According to the analysis given by [72], quantum comput-
ing needs to create a virtuous cycle, similar to that of the
semiconductor industry, in order to generate a commercial
demand by attaining sufficient economic impact and to fund
the development of increasingly useful quantum computers
as a major milestone. The same quandary goes for IoT
devices, for instance, how ultra resource-constrained devices
are going to adopt compute-intensive schemes, how to upgrade
or replace IoT devices to carry out quantum-secure algorithms,
etc. Also, from the software perspective, software developers
must have enough knowledge of quantum theory to write code
for the machines as quantum algorithms require a completely
different way of thinking about problem-solving. In a net
shell, keeping in view a rudimentary stage of evolution of
quantum computers (in terms of hardware and software), most
of the scientists are of the view to wait and see as a lot of
work is needed to build post-quantum systems that are widely
deployable while at the same time inspiring confidence.
c) Environmental Aspects: The computational and process-
ing time required by the signing algorithm highly impacts
the energy consumption by resource-constrained IoT devices
which could ultimately make a somewhat noticeable environ-
mental impact as the number of devices connected to the
Internet is exponentially growing. To curtail such an impact
on the environment, efficient signature algorithms should be
used so to conserve energy which is beneficial for both
scientific interests and environment interests [73]. Another
environmental aspect is the upsurge in e-waste caused due to
new hardware (such as crypto processors) as the existing de-
vices or embedded components may not be able to efficiently
go hand in hand with the quantum-safe algorithms. Moving
to quantum-resistant crypto primitives which involve more
computationally-intensive tasks may affect the performance
of the current systems and even render some devices or
components obsolete.
4) Thinking Ahead: A Pragmatic Approach: While we are
still preparing for quantum-safe algorithms, but at the same
moment, we have to protect the information that is already
vulnerable; therefore, the overarching question is that, which
defensive strategies should be adopted by the government
to avoid significant geopolitical and diplomatic ramifications
and corporate organizations to mitigate potential liabilities? In
the following, we outline a few prudent measures and laying
groundwork that must be adopted by the organizations to plan
and prepare a quantum-secure IoT infrastructure.
• Firstly, identify and document information assets (in-
cluding business value, access control, data sharing ar-
rangement, handling at end-of-life, backup and recovery
procedures) and the current cryptographic protections
(such as lengthening or maximizing current public key
sizes) to determine the organization’s vulnerability to
external and internal threats. Then the next step is to
document the threat models and threat actors as follows:
– The threat models encompass critical infrastructure
deployments and high inter-connectivity and inter-
dependencies among devices, subsystems, and exter-
nal third-party systems. The models must also recog-
nize the requirement of lifetime systems that stretch
over decades while others may refresh annually or
more frequently.
– Identify threat actors and estimate their timeline to
access and exploit quantum technology.
• Secondly, a continuous evaluation based on an estimation
of the lifecycle and field deployment conditions for such
threat models is required as new technologies and attack
vectors emerge.
• Thirdly, investigate the impact of quantum technologies
and conduct a Quantum Risk Assessment (QRA) on
the underlying systems. In this regard, any cyber risk
assessment must be periodically updated to account for
emerging threats and to take advantage of improved
security solutions as quantum technologies are not mature
yet and are still rapidly evolving.
• Fourthly, build crypto agility into systems to ensure an
upgrade path and the ability to conduct remote upgrades
in a secure, timely and pro-active manner.
• Fifthly,
– from the hardware perspective, build devices and
systems with long term security in mind, for instance,
hardware-based key generation for adequate security
of cryptographic operations throughout the lifetime
of the device in the field. Another long-term solution
could be to rely on quantum cryptographic methods
to reduce hypothetical risk to business processes until
quantum computing hardware becomes commodi-
tized into solutions.
– from the software perspective, if possible, finding
other PQC algorithms that can be used as drop-in
replacements to make the transition less disruptive,
– software-as-a-service or third-party platform
providers can also be commissioned for further
assistance,
– perform the cost estimation of new or upgraded hard-
ware and software systems. This may also involve
equipping the organization personnel with practical
quantum skills or even accessing a platform to learn
world-class expertise and technology to advance the
field of quantum computing.
• Finally, after identifying and prioritizing the activities
required to shift the organization’s technology to a
quantum-safe state, keep track of governance infrastruc-
ture and migration plans that are required to respond
to changes into systems in order to address immediate
concerns while permitting the federation of new quantum
technologies.
Thus, now and in the future, strategic thinking and long-term
planning in terms of short-term remedies and small-scale fixes
to repercussions of vulnerable information must be adopted
for protecting sensitive information at banks and government
databases until quantum-safe schemes will become fully avail-
able with pragmatic solutions and current infrastructures are
rendered void.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The countdown of the nascent quantum computing paradigm
commenced upon the realization of security threats to classical
digital signatures schemes. This hype cycle also surges in
the IoT world in order to draw attention to the security,
authenticity, and integrity of sensory data. To address such
issues, HBS is considered to be part of the future portfolio
of deployed PQS particularly due to their minimality of the
required security assumptions.
In this article, we covered different aspects of HBS schemes
including their classification, along with their underlying
construction parameters, and striking features. We focused
on the problem of introducing HBS schemes in the IoT
ecosystem, wherein we highlighted the adoption of suitable
schemes considering application-specific (such as signature
size, signing speed) and platform-dependent (such as memory
constraints, hardware support for specific hash functions)
trade-offs. Furthermore, we also identified a set of future
research challenges with an open-ended discussion in the
adoption of HBS schemes by the IoT community. We hope that
this survey provides close insights to researchers to overcome
the challenges and pave the way for the standardization of
HBS schemes in IoT-based applications.
As a part of our future work, we plan to investigate other
post-quantum signature schemes, compare and evaluate them
in terms of various construction parameters that are necessary
for secure, resource-constrained, and performance-constrained
IoT environment.
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TABLE VII: Current and future research and deployment challenges in HBS-driven IoT.
Class Key challenges Possible solutions
T: Technical challenges NT: Non-technical challenges S: Social challenges
T1: State management
• Synchronization failure of the pri-
vate key between non-volatile and
volatile memory.
• Effecting the performance of the
system, i.e., additional latency for
the signature generation time.
Use stateless or hybrid HBS schemes
to avoid key management issues.
T2: Cloning Using a copied private key without
coordination with execution units or
storage units.
Use stateless or hybrid schemes.
T3: Specification of param-
eters
Require use-case specific parameter
set.
Define standards for parameter set
guidance for use cases.
T4: Trade-off between ex-
cessive data and perfor-
mance
Dynamic dataflow in particular IoT
applications.
Use hybrid HBS schemes.
NT1: Business and eco-
nomic setbacks • How the current embedded hard-
ware can adapt to quantum-safe
cryptographic operations?
• Upgrading or establishing new
IoT infrastructures incurred a
huge economic burden.
Need to identify and plan expenditure
on software and hardware costs.
NT2: Entanglement in
legacy systems, existing
applications, standards, and
protocols
• How to retrofit legacy systems
with advanced security solutions?
• How existing applications and
protocols can adapt to quantum
computing with their current stan-
dards?
• Modify the existing protocols to
handle larger signature or key
size.
• New applications and protocols
must set their standards based
on the demands of quantum
schemes.
NT3: Heterogeneity in
terms of application and
system
How to provide a quintessential in-
frastructure for divergent application
requirements tailored to specific use
cases and diversified architecture re-
quirements strictly depending on plat-
forms and vendors.
• Consider interoperability and in-
tegration of systems.
• Adopt appropriate algorithm after
carefully identifying the system
requirements.
• Promote flexibility and include
abstractions to facilitate integra-
tion among existing applications
and libraries.
NT4: Integrating HBS with
well-known and tested cryp-
tographic libraries
• How to ensure the wide availabil-
ity of HBS in security infrastruc-
tures?
• How to avoid case-by-case imple-
mentation of cryptographic prim-
itives?
Promote integration of HBS with well-
tested and commonly used crypto-
graphic libraries.
continued on the next page
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TABLE VII: Current and future research and deployment challenges in HBS-driven IoT.
Class Key challenges Possible solutions
S1: Ethical and moral issues
• Government agencies having ac-
cess to quantum computers may
attempt to establish dominion
over other nations.
• Colossal firms having quantum
computers may monopolize the
global market.
• Researchers and scientists may
patent or even hoard knowledge,
resulting in limited access to
quantum computing knowledge.
Encouraging widespread knowledge of
the quantum computing paradigm in
both academia and industry through
collaboration.
S2: Skepticism
• Quantum skeptics doubts over the
possibility to build a quantum
computer due to noise in addition
to other factors.
• How to generate a commercial
demand of quantum computers?
• Leverage standardized post-
quantum cryptographic solutions
to remain on safer side.
• Needs to create a virtuous cycle.
S3: Environmental issues
• Energy consumption by mas-
sively deployed IoT devices.
• E-waste caused due to new hard-
ware.
• Use of efficient algorithms to con-
serve energy.
• Retrofitting.
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